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COMPETING MECHANICS' AND FEDERAL TAX LIENS:
CONFLICTS TRIGGERED BY A GENERAL
CONTRACTOR'S DEFAULT*
THE inability of a general contractor to pay his debts often precipitates a
conflict between subcontractors who seek to realize on mechanics' liens and
the federal government as holder of a tax lien.' The subject matter of this
conflict is a fund in the hands of the party who engaged the general con-
tractor. Under the standard construction contract, this party (usually the
owner of the premises),2 while obligated to make periodic progress payments
to the general contractor, retains a specified percentage of each payment until
the contract is fully performed. 3 Moreover, should the contractor default, the
owner may withhold any sums which are due or unpaid the contractor. 4 If
the contractor defaults by failing to pay a subcontractor for goods or services,
state law gives the subcontractor the right to place a mechanic's lien on the
owner's premises 5-a lien which the owner may attempt to discharge with
*United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 257 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. granted,
79 Sup. Ct. 582 (1959).
1. For the hazards which frequently render contractors unable to pay their debts,
see Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 138, 139-40 (1958). For the incidence of failure among con-
struction firms see U.S. STATIsTicAL ABsTRAcT 498 (1957).
2. This party might also be an agent or lessee of the owner. See generally Comment,
68 YALE L.J. 138, 157-59 (1958).
3. PARKER & ADAmS, THE AIA STANDARD CONTRACT FoRass AND THE LAW 25 (1943).
See also LLOYD, BUILDING AND BUILDINGS 18 (1888); CRESWELL, THE LAW RELATING
TO BUILDING AND ENGINEERING CONTRACTS 181-82 (6th ed. 1957) (English treatise).
In states with Pennsylvania-type mechanics' liens, see note 13 infra, a lump-sum con-
tract is also used under which no part of the contract price may be paid to a contractor
until performance is complete. Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 138, 145 (1958). The amount of
money retained by the owner is therefore quite large, often large enough to satisfy the
claims of both mechanics' lienors and the Government.
4. See PARKER & ADA.MS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 40; Note, 66 YALE L.J. 797 (1957).
See also Wolverine Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 165 F. Supp. 335, 342 (N.D. Iowa 1958) ; General
Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Martin Infante Co., 164 F. Supp. 923 (D.N.J. 1958); Closson v.
Billman, 161 Ind. 610, 69 N.E. 449 (1904) (all discussing typical contract forms).
By overreporting the amount of work finished during the initial stages the contractor
may severely limit the amount of money retained by the owner. See Comment, 68 YALE
L.J. 138, 143-44 (1958). On the other hand, the retained fund must be augmented by the
amount of any payments made in fraud of the mechanics' lienors. N.Y. LIEN LAW § 7;
Maycumber v. Wolfe, 10 Misc. 2d 464, 171 N.Y.S.2d 44 (Sup. Ct. 1958); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:44-85 (1952); Hasson v. Bruzel, 104 N.J. Eq. 95, 144 Atl. 319 (Ch. 1929);
'f. J. D. Loizeaut Lumber Co. v. Steinberg, 102 N.J.L. 15, 131 At. 131 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
5. "A mechanic's lien is, essentially, the right of a builder to seek a judicial sale of the
owner's property in order to satisfy unpaid claims." Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 138, 141
(1958). For further definition and explanation, see CREDIT MANUAL OF COMMERCIAL
LAWS, 1959, at 376; RocRE, MECHANICS' LIENS § 2 (1909); Comment, 25 FORHFAM L.
R-v. 100, 101-02 (1956).
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a fund retained by him under the contract.6 But when the contractor is de-
linquent -in paying federal taxes,7 the owner-retained fund may be unavailable
for this purpose, since it is subject to, and may be smaller than, the Govern-
ment's tax claim against the contractor.
The federal tax claim against the fund derives from section 6321 of the
Internal Revenue Code, which imposes a lien "upon all property and rights
to property, whether real or personal, belonging to" a delinquent taxpayers
-here, the contractor. The subcontractor, on the other hand, usually pursues
the fund not because he has a right to it but because it can be used to satisfy
a claim which, by virtue of a mechanics' lien statute, he has against the owner's
premises.9 Commonly, the mechanics' lien statute is of the New York or
Pennsylvania type.10 The liability of the owner of premises is limited by
New York-type statutes to the "amount due . . . under the [construction]
contract" at the time a claimant files notice of his lien (plus any amount
which becomes due thereafter)." Thus, since a retained fund represents the
6. See, e.g., United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 257 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1958),
cert. granted, 79 Sup. Ct. 582 (1959); United States v. Kings County Iron Works,
Inc., 224 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1955) ; Aquilino v. United States, 3 N.Y.2d 511, 146 N.E. 2d
774, 169 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1957), cert. granted, 79 Sup. Ct. 577 (1959); Robertson v.
Huntley & Blazier Co., 351 Ill. App. 378, 115 N.E.2d 533 (1953); Damato v. Leone
Constr. Co., 41 N.J. Super. 366, 125 A.2d 302 (App. Div. 1956); Cattani v. Korsan,
32 N.J. Super. 210, 108 A.2d 110 (App. Div. 1954).
7. See Note, 66 YALE L.J. 797 n.2 (1957). The contractor is liable for amounts which
were or should have been withheld from his employees' wages, see INT. REx CODE OF
1954, § 3403, and for taxes assessed directly against his business, see e.g., §§ 3111, 3301
(Federal Insurance Contributions Act taxes and employment taxes).
S. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6321 (formerly Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3670) ; see
cases cited note 6 supra.
9. The statutes of only seven jurisdictions have been interpreted to give the subcon-
tractor a direct interest in the retained fund. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 38-105, -106 (1951),
Winter v. Hazen-Latimer Co., 42 App. D.C. 469 (D.C. Cir. 1914) (after notice, lienor
has lien on amount due); ILL. Rtv. STAT. ch. 82, §§ 5, 21 (1957), Hall v. Harris, 242
Ill. App. 315 (1926); Miss. CODE: ANN. § 372 (1957) (after notice, amount in owner's
hands is bound), Jake Strickland Lumber Co. v. Rheinhart, 115 Miss. 749, 76 So. 643
(1917) (lien upon amounts paid into court) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:44-78 (1952), Bank-
ers Title & Abstract Co. v. Ferber Co., 15 N.J. 433, 105 A.2d 408 (1954); N.Y. LIEN
LAw §§ 13(7), 36-a, United States v. Kings County Iron Works, Inc., 224 F.2d 232
(2d Cir. 1955); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-6, -8 (1950), United States v. Durham
Lumber Co., 257 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 79 Sup. Ct. 582 (1959);
S.D. CODE § 39.0703 (1939), Keeley Lumber & Coal Co. v. Dunker, 77 N.W.2d 689 (S.D.
1956) (notice gives lienor a separate right from lien on property). The Ohio statute is
virtually identical to that of North Carolina and therefore might be construed in the
same manner. See OHIo Rxv. CODE ANN. § 1311.04 (Page 1953).
10. See 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PRoPERY §§ 16.106F (Casner ed. 1952); 2 GLENN,
MORTGAGES § 351 (1943); Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 138, 142 (1958); Comment, 25 FoRD-
HAm L. REv. 100, 101 (1956).
11. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 254, § 4 (1956). For similar acts, see ALA. CODE ANN. tit.
33, § 37 (1941); CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 49-33 (1958); N.Y. LiEN LAW § 4. Statutes con-
taining the "amount due" limitation are collected in Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 138, 142 n.22
(1958).
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"amount due," and since paying the Government the "amount due" discharges
an owner's contractual obligation, such payment generally terminates the
owner's liability under a mechanic's lien.1 2
In contrast, most Pennsylvania-type statutes preserve the owner's liability
and do not limit it to the "amount due."13 Nevertheless, paying the retained
fund to the Government may substantially vitiate the subcontractor's statutory
lien, for, once the average property owner pays the fund to the Government,
he will not have other cash available with which to discharge the lien. 4 The
subcontractor must then forego his claim or foreclose on the premises, an ex-
pensive and time-consuming procedure. 15
12. No case has specifically held that the owner's payment to the Government termi-
nates his liability under a mechanic's lien. Nevertheless, since such payment eliminates
the amount which measures the owner's liability, it may be assumed that that liability is
thereby erased. Valid payment of other mechanics' lien claims does reduce the owner's
liability. See Herrmann & Grace v. Hillman, 203 N.Y. 435, 96 N.E. 741 (1911); Brain-
ard v. County of Kings, 155 N.Y. 538, 50 N.E. 263 (1898). But see Richman v. City of
New York, 89 Misc. 213, 151 N.Y. Supp. 744 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 21 (1930). These statutes follow one of two forms.
Some impose unlimited liability on the owner. ALASKA Comp. LAWs ANN. § 26-1-9
(194S) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-601 (1948); COLO. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 86-3-2 (1954);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 2702 (1953); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 45-501 (Supp. 1957);
IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-701, -709 (1952); IOWA CODE ANN. § 572.5 (1950); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. ch. 178, § 34 (1954) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 63, § 1 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 429.010 (1952); MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 45-504 (1954); NEE. Rav. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-102 (1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-2-2 (1954); ORE. REv. STAT. § 87.065 (1957);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-28-6 (1957); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3723 (1955); Wis.
STAT. § 289.02 (1953); Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. § 55-201 (1946). Others limit the
owner's lien liability to the contract price. GA. CODE ANN. § 67-2001(2) (1933) ; KAN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1403 (1950); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 376.010 (1955); MxcH.
STAT. ANN. § 26.281 (Supp. 1957); N.D. Rrv. CODE § 35-1207 (1943); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1311.05 (Page 1953); OrLA. STAT. ANN. fit. 42, § 143 (1954); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 64-1120 (1955).
Under all of the foregoing statutes payment in accordance with the contract will not
reduce the owner's liability. See, e.g., McClain v. Coleman, 208 Ky. 163, 270 S.W. 736
(1925); T. Dan Kolker, Inc. v. Shure, 209 Md. 290, 121 A.2d 223 (1956); Better
Roofing Materials Co. v. Sztukouski, 183 S.W.2d 400 (Mo. Ct. App. 1944) ; Bryan v.
Stempkowsld, 88 Pa. Super. 390 (1926). Under those limiting the owner's liability to
the contract price, however, a payment discharging a lien will reduce the owner's re-
maining liability to lienors. E.g., McClain v. Coleman, supra; Rieger v. Schulte, 151 Ky.
129, 151 S.W. 395 (1912).
In some states with Pennsylvania-type statutes, the owner may limit his liability to
the "amount due" by posting an appropriate bond prior to the commencement of work.
E.g., CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 1185.1(6) (1955); COLO. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 86-3-2
(1954) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3743 (1955).
14. In cases involving a conflict between the Government and subcontractors, the
aggregate of mechanics' liens is usually large. See, e.g., lit re Caswell Constr. Co., 13
F.2d 667 (N.D. N.Y. 1926) (subcontractor claims totalling $24,000) ; Robertson v. Hunt-
Icy & Blazier Co., 351 Ill. App. 378, 115 N.E.2d 533 (1953) ($3,400) ; Cattani v. Korsan,
32 N.J. Super. 210, 108 A2d 110 (App. Div. 1954) ($5,000); United States v. Yates,
204 S.W2d 399 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) ($10,000).
15. Mortgage foreclosures ordinarily require at least a year and cost from $250 to
$1,250. See Harvey, Valuation of Mortgage Security, 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 412, 450-51
1959]
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Recognizing the subcontractor's practical interest in a retained fund, one
Pennsylvania- and all New York-type statutes contain "stop notice" pro-
visions.16 They stipulate that, after an owner receives notice of a subcon-
tractor's claim, no payments may be made on the contract until the claim is
satisfied. The owner is thus encouraged to utilize the fund to discharge mech-
anics' liens. Either because of a "stop notice" or because of the embarrass-
ment which might ensue from using a retained fund to satisfy the inferior of
two claims, 7 an owner will often place the fund in the custody of a court,
notify all claimants of his action, and permit the court to determine which
claimant is entitled to the fund.' 8
Until 1958, the leading case on the proper disposition of retained funds as
between competing mechanics' and federal tax liens was the Second Circuit
decision in United States v. Kings County Iron Works, Inc.19 There, the
(table). Although exact figures are unavailable, lien foreclosure undoubtedly involves
similar expense and time. See, e.g., N.Y. LIEN LAW § 43; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 82, §§ 11-21
(1957) (same procedure used in mortgage and lien foreclosure cases).
16. For the New York-type acts, see, e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 33, § 46 (1941);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 84.04, .05 (1943); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 82, § 27 (1957). A few New
York-type jurisdictions do not explicitly prohibit payments after notice, but this prohibi-
tion is implicit in the "amount due" limitation. See CONN. GE,. STAT. § 49-33 (1958)
(owner may credit only bona fide payments made prior to receipt of notice against
amount due on lien claim) ; NEv. Rrv. STAT. § 108.150 (1.957) (contractor may recover
only unpaid contract price less amount of liens; owner may withhold amount of liens
pending suit thereon); S.C. ANN. CODE § 45-254 (1952) (notice to owner required);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-21, -22 (1953) (only payments to contractor before notice of
lien will defeat lien).
The single Pennsylvania-type statute which compels an owner to withhold funds after
a stop notice is filed is COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 86-3-2 (1954). -Other Pennsylvania-type
statutes allow the owner to withhold funds either after notice, ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 62-205
(1940) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 2723 (1953) ; IND. STAT. ANN. § 43-709 (1952) ; MD.
ANN. CODE art. 63, § 13 (1957) ; MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 26281 (Supp. 1957) ; MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 514.07 (1947), or during the pendency of an action on a lien, ALASKA COMP.
LAws ANN. § 26-1-10 (1948) ; ARx. STAT. ANN. § 51-610 (1948) ; CAL. Civ. PRoC. CODE
ANN. § 1186.1 (1955) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 45-511 (1948) ; KAx. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
60-1406 (1950) ; Mo. AN. STAT. § 429.140 (1952) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-2-11 (1954);
Wyo. Coip. STAT. ANN. § 55-220 (1946).
17. An owner may place moneys in the custody of a court to avoid criminal liability
for the misapplication of funds. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 84.07 (1943) (misapplica-
tion of funds constitutes embezzlement) ; N.Y. LIEN LAw § 36 (larceny). He may fur-
ther wish to avoid the lien liability which can result from a failure to withhold. See, e.g.,
LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2774 (1952); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 44-9 (1950). An owner
may also place a fund in the hands of a court to avoid complex litigation. See United
States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 227 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1955), rev'd per curialn.
350 U.S. 1010 (1956); Hulbert v. Hulbert, 216 N.Y. 430, 111 N.E. 70 (1916).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 257 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1958),
cert. granted, 79 Sup. Ct. 582 (1959); United States v. Kings County Iron Works,
Inc., 224 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1955); In re Caswell Constr. Co., 13 F.2d 667 (N.D.N.Y.
1926) ; Bankers Title & Abstract Co. v. Ferber Co., 15 N.J. 433, 105 A.2d 408 (1954):
United States v. Yates, 204 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
19. 224 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1955).
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Government claimed a retained fund in order to satisfy a general contractor's
back taxes, and a subcontractor asserted both an ordinary mechanic's lien on
the owner's property and a direct right to the fund itself. The latter right
arose under the unusual New York statute providing that, upon the perform-
ance of services by a subcontractor, any funds retained by the owner but due
the general contractor are to be held in trust for the subcontractor.2 0 The
Second Circuit determined the comparative rights of the subcontractor and
the Government on the basis of the time-honored rule that the lien first in
time is first in right.2 1  In accordance with an Internal Revenue Code pro-
vision, the court ruled that the time at which the tax assessment list was re-
ceived in the revenue collector's office established the tax lien's relative priori-
ty.22 Then, following a series of Supreme Court decisions,2 3 the court said
that the relative priority of the mechanic's lien would depend on its time of
perfection under federal law.2 4 Because notice of the mechanic's lien had not
20. N.Y. LIEN LAW §§ 13(7), 36-a. Section 13(7) impresses a trust for the benefit
of subcontractors on moneys received by a contractor under a contract and on moneys
"due or to become due" the contractor. The same section allows the subcontractors to
institute a civil action to enforce the trust and to pursue a right of action upon the obli-
gation for the moneys due or to become due. The subcontractors therefore have a di-
rect right of action against the owner. Although holding this right to be inchoate until
reduced to judgment, both Kings County and United States v. Aquilino, 3 N.Y.2d 511,
146 N.E.2d 774, 169 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1957), cert. granted, 79 Sup. Ct. 577 (1959) (a case
which relied upon Kings County), recognized its existence.
21. See 224 F.2d at 234. See also Rankin v. Scott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 175, 179
(1827) ("The principle is believed to be universal, that a prior lien gives a prior claim.
. .. "), quoted in United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 85 (1954). For
other cases applying this doctrine to mechanics' liens, see, e.g., In re Taylorcraft Avia-
tion Corp., 168 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1948) ; In re Caswell Constr. Co., 13 F.2d 667 (N.D.
N.Y. 1926).
22. The provision was Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3671. A tax lien now arises at the
time a tax assessment is made. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6322. The 1954 change is merely
procedural, as assessments are no longer received from the Commissioner, but are now
made in the District Director's office. Treas. Reg. § 301.6201-1 (1954). The change does
not detract from any statements in the text of this Note based on the 1939 Code. See
Plumb, Federal Tax Collection and Lien Problems, 13 TAx L. Ray. 247, 248-49 nn2, 13
(1958).
23. United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950) (attachment
lien) ; United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361 (1953) (local tax lien);
United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1955) (attachment lien); United States v. Liver-
pool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 215 (1955) (garnishment lien); United
States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 (1955) (landlord's distress lien). Since Kings County, a
series of Supreme Court decisions has treated mechanics' liens in the same manner as
attachment and other liens were treated in the above cases. United States v. Hulley, 358
U.S. 66 (1958) (per curiam) ; United States v. Vorreiter, 355 U.S. 15 (1957) (same);
United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956) (same); United States
v. Colotta, 350 U.S. 808 (1955) (same). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's sum-
mary treatment of these latter cases, see Brown, Foreword, The Supreme Court, 1957
Term, 72 HARv. L. REv. 77, 82 (1958).
24. 224 F.2d at 234. See also United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S.
47, 49 (1950) ("The effect of a lien in relation to a provision of federal law for the
19591
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been filed as required by state statute until after the collector had received the
tax list, the court held that the mechanic's lien could not have been federally
perfected early enough to achieve priority over the tax lien.25
Turning to the subcontractor's trust-fund right, the court found that it had
arisen prior to delivery of the tax assessment list. But, the court continued,
the right-analogous to that of an attachment lienor-was at all times in-
choate. This conclusion was based on the same Supreme Court decisions used
to determine the priority of the mechanic's lien. The Second Circuit found
that, under the doctrine of these cases, the subcontractor's trust-fund right had
never been perfected because it had never been reduced to judgment.26
Generally applied, the Kings County rationale would always prevent a
mechanic's lien, or any special right such as that in a New York trust fund,
from being first in time. The Supreme Court cases which Kings Couty
cited as determinative of when a subcontractor's lien rights perfect stand for
the proposition that, as against federal tax liens, a state lien remains inchoate
until the lienor and the property liened against are identified, and until the
amount of the state lien is certain.27 Literally interpreted, these criteria would
ordinarily be met when a mechanic's lienor complied with state filing pro-
cedures.28 But, in the context of a competing federal claim, the Supreme
Court has defined perfection as synonymous with reduction to judgment. 2
Thus, the Court has held that the amount of a state lien remains uncertain
until the underlying claim is reduced to judgment; prior to that event, the
Court reasons, no certainty exists that the lien will continue to be asserted
or that the amount stated in the lien notice is actually owing.30 Similarly, the
Court has ruled that property subject to a lien is not properly identified until
that portion of the property needed to satisfy the lien is judicially ascertained. 31
Hence, even if notice of a mechanic's lien were given at the earliest possible
collection of debts owing the United States is always a federal question."); HART &
WEcHsLEEa, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL Sys=a2i 483-84 (1953).
25. 224 F.2d at 236.
26. Ibid. The Supreme Court cases are cited note 23 supra.
27. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 84 (1954); see cases cited
note 23 supra. The Court's view of perfection was borrowed from decisions under REv.
STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1952). See Kennedy, The Relative Priority of
the Federal Government: The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and General Lien,
63 YALE L.J. 905 (1954) ; Plumb, Federal Tax Collection and Lien Problems, 13
TAX L. REv. 459, 469 (1958). For a discussion of the § 3466 standards, see 9 Maha-
TENS, FEDERAL" INCOmE TAXATION* § 54.12 (1958); Sarner, Correlation of Priority and
Lien Rights in the Collection of Federal Taxes, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 739 (1947).
28. See, e.g., AI.A. CODE ANN. tit. 33, § 41 (1941); CoxN. GEN. STAT. § 49-34
(1958) ; N.Y. LIEN LAw § 9.
29. For discussion and criticism of this definition, see Anderson, Federal Tax Liens
-Their Nature and Priority, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 241 (1953) ; Kennedy, supra note 27;
Plumb, supra note 27.
30. See Plumb, supra note 27, at 470-71, nn.473 & 474 (collecting cases).
31. Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946); United States v. Wad-
dill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353 (1945) ; Plumb, supra note 27, at 471-72.
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moment, the lienor would probably be no more successful than was the Kings
County subcontractor-whose trust right actually antedated delivery of the
tax list.32 The lienor would still face the task, almost impossible in these days
of congested courts, of reducing his lien to judgment before a tax lien arose.33
Kings County is inconsistent with a few state cases in which mechanics'
lienors received preference over the Government.34 These cases reflect a gener-
al desire to circumvent the Supreme Court decisions cited in Kings County
as controlling. 35 State dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court's view of per-
fection is not surprising, for the Court's definition operates without congres-
sional support to weaken the force of local legislation intended to create lien
rights.36
32. "It is well settled that an unforeclosed mechanics' lien even though filed prior to
a Government tax lien will be denied priority because it is not a perfected lien." Wolver-
ine Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 165 F. Supp. 335, 346 (N.D. Iowa 1958).
33. On delay in state courts, see Harvey, Valuation of Mortgage Security, 1957 U.
ILL L.F. 413, 450-51 (table) ; INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, CALENDAR STATUS
STUDY (1956) (delay up to 40 months). See also ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CONFERENCE ON
DELAY IN LITIGATION, PROCEEDNrGs (1956).
34. The South Dakota, New Jersey, and Illinois courts have refused to apply the
Supreme Court's perfection criteria in Kings County situations. See Robertson v. Hunt-
ley & Blazier Co., 351 Ill. App. 378, 115 N.E.2d 533 (1953) ; Bankers Title & Abstract
Co. v. Ferber Co., 15 N.J. 433, 105 A.2d 408 (1954) ; Scott v. Zion Evangelical Luther-
an Church, 75 S.D. 559, 70 N.W.2d 326 (1955). And the only state case decided after
Kings County disagreed with the Second Circuit. Damato v. Leone Constr. Co., 41 N.J.
Super. 366, 125 A.2d 302 (App. Div. 1956). United States v. Yates, 204 S.W.2d 399
(Tex. Civ. App. 1947), reached a similar result, but it was decided before the Supreme
Court's perfection doctrine was formulated in United States v. Security Trust & Say.
Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Hulley, 102 So. 2d 599 (Fla.), rev'd per curiam, 358
U.S. 66 (1958) ; United States v. Griffin-loore Lumber Co., 60 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1953) ;
United States v. Colotta, 224 Miss. 33, 79 So. 2d 474, rev'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 808
(1955). Many courts have followed the Supreme Court's precedents with stated reluct-
ance. See, e.g., Kel Weatherstrip Co. v. Rankin, 124 F. Supp. 555, 560 (D. Alaska 1954)
("Unquestionably there is much in [a contrary holding] ... that appeals to reason and
justice.") ; Union Bldg. & Inv. Co. v. Forest Hill Apartments, Inc., 30 N.J. Super. 130,
135, 103 A.2d 648, 650 (L. 1954) ("While the equities are all in favor of [the mechanic's
lienor] ... I am reluctantly forced to the conclusion that [his] motion must be denied.").
For a decision expressing disagreement in particularly strong terms, see United States
v. Vorreiter, 134 Colo. 543, 307 P.2d 475, rev'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 15 (1957). See also
authorities cited note 29 supra. But see Fleming v. Brownfield, 47 Wash. 2d 857, 290 P.2d
993 (1955).
36. "As an original matter it would seem questionable that Congress could be thought
to have intended to upset or override prior commercial transactions giving rise to valid
liens." Brown, Foreword, The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72 HARv. L. Rxv. 77, 84
(1958). In United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950), the majori-
ty decision which formulated the criteria for perfection gave no reasons for them other
than that the same criteria were used under Revised Statutes § 3466, which applies to
situations in which the party in debt to the Government has committed an act of bank-
ruptcy. Justice Jackson concurred on the ground that the Internal Revenue Code of 1939
(like the 1954 Code) requires that notice of a tax lien be filed in a state-designated
19591
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Also inconsistent with Kings County is a 1958 Fourth Circuit case involv-
ing similar facts and law-United States v. Durham Lumber Co.37 Like
Kings County, Durham Lumber arose out of a contractor's inability to pay
his debts, and settled the conflicting claims of a subcontractor and the federal
government to an owner-retained fund. Here, too, the subcontractor alleged
a direct right to the fund in addition to his New York-type mechanic's lien
on the owner's premises.38 Again, the direct right stemmed from atypical
legislation: a North Carolina statute which, first, allows subcontractors to
supply an owner with a list of amounts owed them by a general contractor,
and, second, requires the owner who receives such a list to pay the subcon-
tractors out of funds withheld from the general contractor for this purpose.30
As a further parallel to Kings County, the Government's tax lien in Durham
Lumber came into existence before the subcontractor had filed the notice
establishing his lien.4°
The Fourth Circuit began its Durham Lumber decision by distinguishing
the Supreme Court cases on which Kings County relied.41 In each of those
cases, the delinquent taxpayer had an indisputable property interest in the
property against which the Government asserted its tax lien; and the essen-
tial issue was whether the federal lien or a state lien had priority with re-
public office in order for the Government's claim to have priority over the rights of pled-
gees, mortgagees, purchasers, and judgment creditors. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6323.
In giving such protection to a special class of creditors, Jackson reasoned, Congress in-
dicated its intention that no other claimants should be protected from the Government
lien. 340 U.S. at 53. Legislative history reveals no such intent. See Brown, supra at 84
nn.35 & 36. Nevertheless, recent decisions indicate that the Court has accepted Jackson's
reasoning. Id. at 87. See also Kennedy, supra note 27, at 924 n.114; Plumb, supra note 27,
at 468.
Four recent memorandum decisions indicate that the Court intends to adhere to its
perfection criteria. United States v. Hulley, 358 U.S. 66 (1958) ; United States v. Vor-
reiter, 355 U.S. 15 (1957) ; United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010
(1956) ; United States v. Colotta, 350 U.S. 808 (1955). In each case, the Court ignored
United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954) (city real estate tax liens held
perfected) (a decision "hardly to be brushed aside summarily," Brown, supra at 86).
37. 257 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 79 Sup. Ct. 582 (1959).
38. 257 F2d at 573. For the North Carolina mechanics' lien statute, see N.C. Ga.
STAT. ANN. § 44-6 (1950).
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 44-9 (1950). Section 44-8 requircs the contractor to
furnish an itemized statement showing amounts owed to subcontractors. Since in the
instant case the contractor had not done so, the subcontractors filed a statement to pro-
tect their rights. 257 F.2d at 571.
40. Unlike that in Kings County, however, the tax lien in Durham Lumber also ante-
dated the subcontractor's direct right to the fund. But this fact could not be used to dis-
tinguish Kings County, since Kings County had found for the Government.
41. 257 F.2d at 572. The Fourth Circuit distinguished by name only United States v.
White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956), a memorandum decision which came
after Kings County. White Bear, in turn, cited no authority but followed the perfection
doctrine as established in the cases relied upon by Kings County. See Plumb, supra note
27, at 471. For the cases relied upon by Kings County, see note 23 supra.
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spect to the taxpayer's property interest.42 But, the Fourth Circuit said, the
priority issue does not arise in Durham Lumber because the delinquent tax-
payer at bar-the contractor-had no property interest in that portion of the
owner-retained fund claimed by the subcontractor. The court then ruled that,
inasmuch as section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code establishes a lien
only upon property "belonging to" a delinquent taxpayer, the Government
may not impress a tax lien upon owner-retained moneys in which the con-
tractor (that is, the delinquent taxpayer) has no property interest.43
The Fourth Circuit considered state law as determinative of whether the
contractor had a property interest in the owner-retained fund. In North
Carolina, a contractor has no right to payment until he files notice that he has
paid all the debts owed his subcontractors. 44 Since the Durham Lumber con-
tractor had not paid his subcontractors and consequently had not filed the
notice, the court ruled that the owner's obligation to his general contractor
was subordinate to the subcontractors' interests. 45 For this reason, the court
said that the Government, as claimant against the contractor, was entitled
only to that portion of the fund remaining after the owner paid the subcon-
tractors in full.
40
The court recognized, however, that its property-rights approach was radi-
cally different from the Second Circuit's Kings County doctrine of first in
time, first in right. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit attempted to distinguish
Kings County. That case, the court said, involved a "very different situa-
tion" in which "the only question . . . was the one of relative priority of
competing claims to the same fund."4 7 This reasoning overlooks the fact
that, if the Durham Lumber rationale had been employed in Kings County,
the latter would no more have presented "competing claims to the same
fund" than did Durham Lumber itself. Like the North Carolina law govern-
42. The Supreme Court has applied its first-to-perfect doctrine in the cases cited note
23 supra. In each, the delinquent taxpayer was the undisputed owner of the property on
which a tax lien had attached.
43. 257 F.2d at 574.
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. AxN. § 44-8 (1950). "The general contractor, before receiving
any payment from the owner, is required to file with the owner a statement of all sums
due subcontractors .... " 257 F.2d at 572.
45. Id. at 575.
46. Ibid. See also United States v. Winnett, 165 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1947) ; United
States v. Graham, 96 F. Supp. 318, 321 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
Arguably, the court might have decided for the Government on the basis of North
Carolina's New York-type mechanics' lien statute, which limits the lien to the "amount
due" the general contractor under the contract. N.C. GriN. STAT. ANN. § 44-6 (1950).
The court could have reasoned that "due" means "owing to" and that, in order to sus-
tain his claim, the mechanic's lienor must admit the contractor's right to the retained
fund. This argument, however, distorts the purpose of the "amount due" limitation, which
serves to protect the owner by limiting his liability, not to grant a property right to the
general contractor. See, e.g., Heckmann v. Pinkney, 81 N.Y. 211 (1880); Wright v.
Roberts, 43 Hun 413 (N.Y. 1887).
47. 257 F.2d at 574.
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ing the rights of subcontractors, the New York trust-fund statute makes
the full payment of all subcontractors a condition precedent to the general
contractor's acquisition of any right in an owner-retained fund.48 Thus, the
relevant facts and local law in Kings County were the same as those which,
in Durhamn Lumber, led to the holding that the Government's section 6321
tax lien attached only to that withheld amount remaining after the subcon-
tractors had been paid. Moreover, this same section 6321 argument had been
advanced and rejected in Kings County. And the Second Circuit, treating
the federal claim as going to the entire withheld fund, had applied the test of
first in time. 49
Apparently, the Durham Lumber court sought not only to distinguish but
also, in the alternative, to impeach Kings County. In a later case-Fidelity
& Deposit Co. v. New York City Housing Authority-the Second Circuit
had looked to a delinquent taxpayer's construction contract and determined
that, in effect, the provision for an owner-retained fund subordinated a sec-
tion 6321 tax lien to a surety's interest in the fund. 0 Hence, the Fourth
Circuit implied, the Second Circuit has itself overruled Kings County sub
silentio.51 Actually, however, the ratio decidendi of Fidelity & Deposit was
urged on the Second Circuit in Kings County in the form of a New York
Court of Appeals decision which provided the basis of Fidelity & Deposit.52
48. Although, in New York, owner-retained moneys may be paid the general con-
tractor, he must hold them as a trustee for the benefit of subcontractors. The trust is
created as they do their work and consequently arises before the contractor has any right
to the trust fund himself. Thus, although the two statutes differ in form, both create the
same condition precedent to the contractor's right to a retained fund. Conzpare N.Y.
LiEN LAw §§ 13(7), 36-a with N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 44-8 (1950).
49. 224 F.2d at 235.
50. 241 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1957), Note, 66 YALE L.J. 797.
51. 257 F.2d at 574. The Fourth Circuit, noting that a New York Court of Appeals
decision, Aquilino v. United States, 3 N.Y.2d 511, 146 N.E.2d 774, 169 N.Y.S.2d 9
(1957), cert. granted, 79 Sup. Ct. 577 (1959), was at variance with Durham Lumber,
stated that the New York court had wrongly relied on Kings County instead of relying
on Fidelity & Deposit. The Fourth Circuit further observed that, if the New York court
had relied on the latter case, Aquilino would not have been at variance with Durham
Lumber. Since Kings County and Aquilino involved identical problems, the Fourth Cir-
cuit, by stating that the Second Circuit's decision in Fidelity & Deposit was contrary to
Aquilino, implied that Fidelity & Deposit had overruled Kings Coun;ty.
This indirect approach to an impeachment of Kings County is inconsistent with the
court's treatment of Fidelity & Deposit elsewhere in Durhamn Lumber. For the Fourth
Circuit also attempted to distinguish Kings County from both Fidelity & Deposit and
Durham Lumber on the ground that Kings County was concerned with a situation differ-
ent from that in either of the other cases. 257 F.2d at 574. Actually, however, Fidelity
& Deposit is as indistinguishable from Kings County as is Durham Lumber-for the
reasons set forth in the text accompanying notes 47-49 supra. Of course, Fidelity & De-
posit can be distinguished as adjudging the claim of a surety rather than that of a sub-
contractor. See note 53 infra and accompanying text. But this fact is of no help in dis-
tinguishing Durham Lumber from Kings County, both of which passed on subcontractor
claims.
52. 224 F2d at 235. The New York decision was United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v.
Triborough Bridge Authority, 297 N.Y. 31, 74 N.E.2d 226 (1947). In Fidelity & Depos-
[Vol. 68:985
~] MECHANICS' AND FEDERAL TAX LIENS
The Second Circuit ruled that the New York decision established the rights
of a surety rather than a subcontractor and therefore was not applicable in
Kings Counity.53 Moreover, the Second Circuit subsequently observed in
Fidelity & Deposit that that'case and the New York decision on which it re-
lied were both consistent with Kings County.5
4
In sum, Durham Lumber failed either to distinguish Kings County or to
uncover precedent discrediting it. That the two decisions are in conflict is a
fact apparently recognized by the Supreme Court, for it recently agreed to
review both Durham Lumber and Aquilino v. United States, a New York
Court of Appeals decision which followed the Kings County rule of first in
time.r
As between Kings County and Durham Lumber, the latter is more faithful
to the terms of the Internal Revenue Code. Section 6321 specifically restricts
a government lien to that portion of an owner-retained fund presently "be-
longing to" a contractor with a tax arrearage. 56 Before Kings County, all
cases according priority to section 6321 liens involved delinquent taxpayers
who had present rights in the property liened against. 57 When deciding this
type of case, the Supreme Court was faced with conflicting interests of equal
it, the Second Circuit had said that it was bound by Triborough Bridge. 241 F.2d at 147.
That decision favored a surety's claim over a federal tax lien on a retained fund. The
New York court rested its decision on an interpretation of the construction contract be-
tween owner and general contractor. 297 N.Y. at 36, 74 N.E.2d at 228.
53. 224 F2d at 235. The Second Circuit also ruled that the New York decision es-
tablished that the rights of the surety to the fund were perfected so as to antedate the
federal tax lien. Ibid. This ruling is inconsistent with the interpretation which, in Fidelity
& Deposit, the Second Circuit subsequently gave the New York decision. The Second
Circuit there ruled that the New York decision had established that the contractor had
no property rights in an owner-retained fund. 241 F.2d at 144.
54. Id. at 145. The Second Circuit ruled that, whereas Fidelity & Deposit and the
New York decision involved the property rights of the delinquent taxpayers, Kings
County was concerned solely with the question of priority. The Second Circuit also noted
that Kings County construed a statute similar to all lien statutes, the difference in vocabu-
lary being ascribed to "peculiar local conditions." Ibid. Therefore, the court said, the
delinquent taxpayer had an undivested property interest which he did not have in Fidelity
& Deposit. Ibid. The Government, apparently, disagrees, and has suggested that a con-
flict exists between Fidelity & Deposit and Kings County. Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v.
Martin Infante Co., 164 F. Supp. 923, 928 (D.N.j. 1958).
55. 79 Sup. Ct. 577 (1959). The New York Court of Appeals decision appears
at 3 N.Y.2d 511, 146 N.E.2d 774, 169 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1957). The lower state court had fol-
lowed the Durham Lumbcr ratidnale' 2 App. Div. 2d 747, 153 N.Y.S.2d 268 (1956).
56. INT. R-v. CODE OF 954, § 6321. "[T]he rights of the [tax) Collector do not ex-
tend beyond those of the taxpayer whose right to property is sought to be levied upon."
United States v. Graham, 96 F. Supp. 318, 321 (S.D. Cal. 1951); see United States v.
Winnett, 165 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1947); Bankers Title & Abstract Co. v. Ferber Co.,
15 N.J. 433, 105 A.2d 408 (1954).
57 See note 23 supra; United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 (1955) ; United States
v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1955). In United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81
(1954), the only case in which Government lost, the delinquent taxpayer also owned the
property before any liens arose.
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substance and was, therefore, justified in preferring the first lienor to per-
fect.58 In a Durham Lumber or Kings County situation, on the other hand,
the delinquent taxpayer (the general contractor) has no present right to that
portion of the fund in which subcontractors, by virtue of local law, have di-
rect rights. And the general contractor would not obtain such a present right
unless the subcontractors failed to assert their rights or, asserting them,
were paid in full.5 9 Absent a present right in the general contractor, a feder-
al tax lien can attach to a withheld fund only if conditions precedent are
ignored and the Government is granted a lien on property not "belonging
to" the delinquent taxpayer.00 So long, therefore, as subcontractors have
direct rights in a retained fund, the first-to-perfect rule is inapposite in set-
tling a section 6321 claim against the entire fund.
By disregarding the true nature of the Government's lien interest, the
Kings County decision was able to employ a rule which implements a favored
policy of tax administration-achieving uniformity of result in similar cases.0 '
58. Whether the Court properly found that the federal tax lien was the first perfected
is another matter. See Anderson, supra note 29; Plumb, supra note 27, at 468; Wolfen
& Cohan, The United States as a Creditor for Taxes, 35 TAxEs 684 (1957).
59. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
60. In Fidelity & Deposit, the Second Circuit specifically noted that the construction
contract made payment of subcontractors a condition precedent to the contractor's ac-
quisition of rights in the fund. On that ground, the surety's claim was accorded superior-
ity. 241 F.2d at 144. It might be argued that the contractor, having a right to the fund
on satisfaction of the condition precedent, has a contingent right. In turn, the contingent
right might be given superiority-the Supreme Court's perfection doctrine having classi-
fied the more substantial interest of the subcontractor as unperfected. Utilization of the
perfection doctrine to, in effect, transform a contingency into a certainty would, however,
constitute a startling innovation. In past cases, the Supreme Court has applied the doc-
trine solely to determine priority among liens representing equal substantive rights. See
cases cited note 23 supra.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399 (1941); Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S.
188 (1938) ; Niagra Hudson Power Corp. v. Hoey, 117 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1941) ; Weil v.
United States, 115 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1940). For the suggestion that the uniformity doc-
trine should have been determinative in Fidelity & Deposit, see Note, 66 Y.A.E L.J. 801
(1957). Compare text accompanying note 81 infra.
While the uniformity principle has been emphasized primarily in connection with the
existence of tax liability, the Second Circuit apparently extended the principle's force
into the area of collection. Compare cases cited above; Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S.
39 (1958). In Stern, a Kentucky statute was read to limit the federal tax liability of a
beneficiary of a life insurance policy-sued for income tax deficiencies of an insured-to
the amount of premiums paid in fraud of creditors. Considering the effect of that statute,
Justice Black, dissenting, seemed to distinguish between uniform liability and uniform col-
lection policy:
In my judgment it is a mistake to look to state law to decide . . . [the] liability
[of a party for federal income taxes]. The laws of several States are bound to
vary widely. . . . [L]iability for federal taxes should be determined by uniform
principles of federal law ....
Of course, state law must be consulted to determine what property rights and
interests a taxpayer actually has. But once these rights and interests are thus es-
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The New York trust-fund provision, which requires that a retained fund be
used to pay subcontractors ahead of a general contractor, is peculiar to that
state.0 2 The Second Circuit seemed to fear that a precedent giving the sub-
contractor's trust-fund right proper recognition would cause the priority of
federal tax liens to vary from state to state 63 in accordance with the various
supplementary rights which the several states may grant.
In contrast, the Durham Lumber court evidently was not concerned with
the problem of uniformity, for its opinion turned on a North Carolina law
almost as rare as New York's trust-fund statute. 4 In the vast majority of
states, a subcontractor's claim to withheld moneys is based on a mechanics'
lien statute supplemented, possibly, by a stop-notice provision.65 And satis-
fying a mechanic's lien would not be a condition precedent to a contractor's
acquiring rights in an owner-retained fund, since a mechanic's lien attaches
only to the owner's premises.6 6 A stop notice, on the other hand, may or may
not activate such a condition precedent. At present, the stop-notice provi-
sions of but three jurisdictions have been construed to provide the subcon-
tractor with a direct interest in a retained fund.67 In the remaining stop-
notice jurisdictions, a stop notice seems merely to divest a contractor of his
already existing rights in a fund pending the discharge of mechanics' liens.6
Conditions precedent and subsequent are susceptible of manipulation, how-
ever, and courts approving the result in Durham Lumber may interpret other
stop-notice statutes as making the discharge of mechanics' liens a condition
tablished, their consequence for purposes of federal taxation is a matter of federal
law.
Id. at 47-48.
62. N.Y. LIEx LAW §§ 7, 36-a. Only Wisconsin has a somewhat similar provision.
Wis. STAT. § 289.02 (1953).
63. That this may have underlain the Second Circuit's decision is indicated by its
reference to the uniformity principle, 224 F.2d at 235, and by its characterization of the
New York trust-fund provision as a normal lien statute employing an unusual "vocabu-
lary" for which "peculiar local conditions were responsible." 241 F.2d at 145.
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-8, -9 (1949). OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1311.04 (Page
1953) is virtually identical with the North Carolina statute. FLA. SrAT. ANN. § 84.04
(1943) is somewhat similar in requiring a statement from the general contractor before
the final payment can be made by the owner.
65. All states have mechanics' lien legislation. For those with stop-notice provisions,
see note 16 supra.
66. Statutes granting the subcontractor only an ordinary mechanic's lien leave the
general contractor's interest in the retained fund unaffected by the filing of liens. See,
e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-22 (1953) ; VT. STAT. § 2754(11) (1947) ; VA. CODE ANN.
§ 43-7 (1950).
67. See District of Columbia, Mississippi, and South Dakota statutes and cases cited
note 9 supra. Four other states, however, provide the subcontractor with a direct interest
in the owner-retained fund under provisions other than these providing a stop notice.
See Illinois, New Jersey, New York, and North Carolina statutes cited note 9 supra.
69. See, e.g., LA.. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2772 (1951) ; MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 254, §
4 (1956) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 43-7 (1950).
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precedent to the contractor's rights in a retained fund. 69 The Durham Lum-
ber approach still would not achieve uniformity, however, since more than
twenty states do not have stop-notice legislation.70
In formulating a property-rights rule yielding nonuniform tax conse-
quences, the Fourth Circuit cited the Supreme Court's post-Kings County
decision of United States v. Bess.71 This case held that, under section 6321
of the Internal Revenue Code, property rights are defined by state law.12
Bess thus seems to invite disparate results and to sanction the rationale of
Durham Lumber. But Bess did not resolve a conflict between state and
federal liens, and the Supreme Court may not have intended it to govern
such a conflict.73 Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit's use of that decision is
not unjustifiable. Arguably, uniformity in tax collection is less important
than finding an avenue whereby mechanics' lienors can escape the Supreme
Court's singularly harsh view of what constitutes perfection in section 6321
cases.'
4
If the Durham Lumber court sought to enunciate a property-rights doc-
trine confining, rather than a single decision avoiding, the Supreme Court's
69 The distinction between precedent and subsequent is based on differences in phrase-
ology. Compare "no right until an accounting is rendered or subcontractors are paid,"
see, e.g., N.Y. LIEN LAW §§ 7, 36-a; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 44-8 (1950), with "a
right until stop notice is filed," see statutes cited note 16 supra.
70. In some of these jurisdictions, the owner may withhold funds during the pen-
dency of action on mechanics' liens. ALASKA ComP. LAWS ANN. § 26-1-10 (1948);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-610 (1948); CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 1186.1 (1955);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 45-511 (1948); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1406 (1950); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 429.140 (1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-2-11 (1954); Wyo. COwMP. STAT.
ANN. § 55-220 (1946). Other states prohibit an action by the contractor for a specified
period. IOWA CODE ANN. § 572.13, .14 (1950) ; NEa. RE V. STAT. ANN § 52-101 (1952) ;
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 143 (1954). And Oregon allows the contractor to sue for only
the amount due under the contract less the amount of lien claims. Om REv. STAT. §
87-070 (1957). Finally, some jurisdictions have no provision which would in any way
protect the subcontractor's interest in the owner's use of retained funds. Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 376.010 (1955); MIE. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 778, § 34 (1954); N.D. REv. CODE
§ 35-1201 (1943) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-28-1, -6 (1957).
71. 357 U.S. 51 (1958).
72. Section 6321 of the 1954 Code (§ 3670 of the 1939 Code) "creates no property
rights but merely attaches consequences, federally defined, to rights created under state
law . . . ." 357 U.S. at 55. Three opinions were given in Bess. Four Justices accepted
state law as determinative of the existence of property rights. Two Justices acknowl-
edged the function of state law but partially dissented on other grounds. And three
Justices concurred in the result but based their opinion on Justice Black's dissent in
Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39, 47 (1958), decided the same day as Bess-. Black's
dissent said that state law determines the existence of property rights. See note 61 supra.
Thus, the entire Court agreed on the fact that, under § 6321, state law establishes
whether property rights exist.
73. At issue in Bess were the property rights which a decedent's estate has in a
life insurance policy on the decedent's life. 357 U.S. at 55.
74. For discussion and criticism of that view, see authorities cited notes 29. 36
supra.
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first-to-perfect rule, it erred in gearing its opinion to the unusual North
Carolina law on subcontractor rights. By looking instead to the building con-
tract between owner and general contractor, as the Second Circuit did in
Fidelity & Deposit,75 the Fourth Circuit could have fashioned a rationale
which would produce uniform results regardless of the peculiarities of state
law. Fidelity & Deposit (later endorsed by the Supreme Court in the Bess
case) 7 presented substantially the same problem as Durham Lumber: a con-
test between the Government and a surety who had paid off subcontractors.
The Second Circuit's opinion was bottomed on the fact that the fund at issue
had been retained under a standard building contract, which, according to
the New York courts, made "proof that the contractor had paid" his subcon-
tractors a "condition precedent" to payment of the general contractor.7 7 Ac-
cordingly, the court felt constrained to follow a New York Court of Appeals
ruling that "so long as [debts owed subcontractors] . . . were outstanding
and unpaid and so long as [the owner] . . . had the right to withhold and
apply, the contractor had no rights to the fund, and, consequently, no prop-
erty interest therein upon which [the Government] . . . could place a lien."7 8
Relying as it does on a standard contract between owner and contractor,
rather than on a particular state statute, the Fidelity & Deposit rationale
(albeit restricted by the Second Circuit to surety cases)7 9 is more widely
applicable than that of Durham Lumber. Indeed, the Fidelity & Deposit
approach could be used in any situation requiring the determination of a
contractor's property interest in an owner-retained fund. Most construction
contracts are of standard form and contain the same provisions which Fideli-
ty & Deposit found pertinent.8 0 Furthermore, the language of those provi-
sions is so clear that the "condition precedent" interpretation of the New
York courts has been accepted by other states in surety cases.8 ' A different
75. 241 F2d at 146; Note, 66 YALE L.J. 797, 800 (1957).
76. 357 U.S. at 55.
77. 241 F2d at 144.
78. Ibid., quoting from United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Triborough Bridge Auth-
ority, 297 N.Y. 31, 37, 74 N.E.2d 226, 228 (1947).
79. The Second Circuit refused to apply the Fidelity & Deposit rationale in Kings
County. The court ruled that United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Triborough Bridge
Authority, 297 N.Y. 31, 74 N.E.2d 226 (1947), a surety case, was not controlling in a
Kings County fact situation. 224 F2d at 235. On the other hand, Triborough was fol-
lowed by the Second Circuit in Fidelity & Deposit, itself a surety case. See note 52
supra.
80. See PARKER & ADAMS, THE AIA STANDARD CONTRACt FoRMs AND THE LAW 40
(1954). Under the standard construction contract a "failure by the contractor to pay
for labor and material [is] just as much a failure to perform and carry out the terms of
the contract as an abandonment of the work would have been." Fidelity & Deposit Co.
v. New York City Housing Authority, 241 F2d at 144, quoting from United States Fid.
& Guar. Co. v. Triborough Bridge Authority, supra note 78, at 36, 74 N.E.2d at 228.
81. See, '.g.. General Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Martin Infante Co., 164 F. Supp. 923
(D.N.J. 1958); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Miller, 143 F. Supp. 941 (W.D.N.C.
1956); Great Am. Indem. Co. v. United States, 120 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. La. 1954).
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reading seems unlikely. Moreover, should there be no specific contractual
provision making the payment of subcontractors a condition precedent to the
general contractor's right to withheld moneys, the courts would undoubtedly
infer such a condition precedent unless the contract specifically provided
otherwise.8 2 Mechanics' lien policy in all states seemingly dictates that a
general contractor's performance be considered incomplete so long as the
owner remains liable;83 and that, even when construction is complete, the
general contractor receive only so much of an owner-retained fund as ex-
ceeds debts outstanding to subcontractors.8 4 Thus, the Fourth Circuit's prop-
erty-rights approach, if geared to the contractual rights of general contrac-
In these cases, the surety has prevailed on a "no debt" theory involving an examination
of the standard construction contract. Prior to the emergence of this theory, the surety's
claim was accorded superiority on any one of several grounds all of which became in-
effective when faced with the Supreme Court's perfection doctrine. Thus, the surety
was held to have been subrogated to the mechanics' lienors, e.g., United States Fid. &
Guar. Co. v. Sweeney, 80 F2d 235 (8th Cir. 1935); New York Cas. Co. v. Zxerner,
58 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. Ill. 1944) ;-to have been the holder of an equitable lien, e.g.,
American Sur. Co. v. Louisville Municipal Housing Comm'n, 63 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Ky.
1945), aff'd sub nom. Glenn v. American Sur. Co., 160 F2d 977 (6th Cir. 1947) ; In re
Van Winkle, 49 F. Supp. 711 (W.D. Ky. 1943) ;-and to have been the holder of a
chattel mortgage, R. F. Ball Constr. Co. Inc. v. Jacobs, 140 1. Supp. 60 (W.D. Tex.),
aff'd per curiam, 239 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1956), rev'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 587 (1958).
He has also been held to be subrogated to the rights of the contractor. E.g., Hardaway
v. National Sur. Co., 211 U.S. 552 (1909); Henningsen v. United States Fid. & Guar.
Co., 208 U.S. 404 (1908), but that rationale is clearly in conflict with the "no debt"
approach. For a discussion of these various theories, see Wolverine Ins. Co. v. Phillips,
165 F. Supp. 335, 346 (N.D. Iowa 1958).
82. Suppose an owner contracts to pay a certain price and the contractor, undvr a
contract making no mention of payment of subcontractors, hires laborers and order.
material for the contracted job. Unless the contractor's payment of subcontractors is
considered a condition precedent to his own payment, should the contractor not pay the
subcontractors, the owner's liability under the contract will exceed the contract price
(for the subcontractors will have mechanics' liens against the owner's premises). Such
could not have been the intended result of a contract setting a single contract price.
Therefore, payment of the subcontractors by the contractor should be deemed a condi-
tion precedent to the contractor's acquisition of any rights to an owner-retained fund.
Cf. 3 CoRBiN, CONTRACTS § 562 (1951).
83. State policy strongly favors subcontractors and has accordingly produced the
mechanics' lien statutes. See In re Taylorcraft Aviation Corp., 168 F.2d 808 (6th Cir.
1948); United States v. Griffin-Moore Lumber Co., 62 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1953); City
Lumber & Supply Co. v. Fisher, 256 Wis. 402, 41 N.W2d 285 (1950). Thus, these
statutes are liberally construed. See, e.g., T. Dan Kolker, Inc. v. Shure, 209 Md. 290,
121 A.2d 223 (1956). In order to effectuate the policy behind these statutes, absent
a contractual provision for the payment of subcontractors, their interest would doubt-
less be protected by making their payment a condition precedent to the general con-
tractor's acquisition of any right in the fund. Cf. Robertson v. Huntley & Blazier Co..
351 Ill. App. 378, 115 N.E.2d 533 (1953); 3 ColniN, CoxTRACrS § 701 (1950).
84. Substantial performance under the contract would entitle the contractor to only
that portion of the contract price remaining unpaid less an amount necessary to com-
pensate the owner for any damage to him caused by defects in the general contractor's
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tors, would enable mechanics' lienors to prevail over the Government in all
situations similar to that in Durham Lumber.8 5
This modification of Durham Lumber would, however, raise certain prob-
lems. The subcontractor who contested the Government's lien in that case had
a personal, statutory right to the retained fund. Absent such a right or
broadly construed stop-notice legislation, a subcontractor's rights consist sole-
ly of his mechanic's lien against the owner's premises.8 6 Hence, while pay-
ment of the subcontractor would be a condition precedent to the general con-
tractor's acquiring a right in the retained fund, the owner will have exclusive
rights therein pending the occurrence of the condition precedent. Only a claim-
ant, such as a surety, who is subrogated to the owner's rights succeeds to the
owner's defense that the contractor has no rights in the fund.87 A subcon-
tractor, however, must rely on a contract to which he was not a party in order
to defeat a federal tax lien purportedly attaching to a general contractor's
interest in the fund. And, ordinarily, one may not assert the title of a non-
litigant-here, the owner-in order to defeat an opposing party's claim. 8
Nonetheless, section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code would seem to
dictate an exception to the rule forbidding inquiry into the title of nonlitigants.
By imposing a tax lien only on property "belonging to" a delinquent taxpayer
(the general contractor), that section requires a determination of the con-
tractor's rights to an owner-retained fund irrespective of the opposing claim-
performance. See Damato v. Leone Constr. Co., 41 N.J. Super. 366, 125 A.2d 302 ('App.
Div. 1956); 3 CoRBiN, CoxNTRACrs § 701 (1950). Mechanics' lien liability could be deemed
to flow from such a defect.
85. The Government has urged, however, that private contractual provisions can-
not diminish the Government's rights under the tax statutes. See United States v. Kings
County Iron Works, 224 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1955); United States v. Manufacturers
Trust Co., 198 F.2d 366 (2d Cir. 1952). "It has therefore been urged that the con-
tractor's interest in any funds which have been earned is a right to property subject to
the tax lien, notwithstanding contractual provisions limiting the contractor's right to
payment." Note, 66 YALE L.J. 797, 800 n.17 (1957). Although this argument was ac-
cepted in Kings County, the Second Circuit later rejected it in Fidelity & Deposit Co. v
New York City Housing Authority, 241 F2d 142, 144 (2d Cir. 1957). Other federal
courts have taken the Fidelity & Deposit approach in surety cases. See note 81 mpra.
If successful, this argument might give the Government funds which the contractor
never actually earned, for he may have overreported the amount of work done before
his default. Owner-retained percentages would then exceed the proper measure of the
contractor's performance. 66 YALE L.J. at 800 n.17.
86. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
87. "Under the usual rule of subrogation a surety who satisfies the claims of his
l,rincipal's creditors acquires the rights of those creditors and any security held by
them." Note, 66 YALE L.J. 797 (1957) ; see, e.g., Lacy v. Maryland Cas. Co., 32 F.2d 48
(4th Cir. 1932); Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. Lehman-Hoge Scott, 122 F.
Supp. 314 (N.D. Ala. 1954). But cf. United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234
(1947).
88. The general rule is that a defendant may not set up a defense in favor of a
third party. See, e.g., Los Angeles First Nat'l Bank v. Northrup, 120 Cal. App. 677,
S P.2d 528 (1932) ; Ducros v. Gottschalk, 25 La. Ann. 233 (1873).
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ant's identity.8 9 A court could readily make this determination by examining
the construction contract. Thus, a contract-oriented Durham Lumber approach
would present difficulties, but far from insurmountable ones. 0 More positive-
ly, this approach, while circumventing the Supreme Court's much-maligned
first-to-perfect cases, would achieve uniform results and thereby implement
the tax policy favored in Kings County.
89. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6321; authority cited note 72 supra.
90. If the subcontractor could be considered a third-party creditor beneficiary of the
construction contract, these difficulties would disappear. The subcontractor could then be
subrogated to the owner's rights in the retained fund-the right to receive the fund on
default by the general contractor. See 2 WIlSTON, CONTRACTS § 364 (rev. ed. 1936).
The subcontractor would not be a third-party beneficiary, however, unless the con-
tractor's promise to pay his subcontractors was made to the owner "primarily" for the
benefit of the subcontractors. See 4 CoRaix, CONTRACTS § 776 (1951). And such a
promise would ordinarily be elicited by the owner for his own benefit (to avoid
mechanics' lien liability) rather than for the benefit of the subcontractor. See 2 WIL-
LiSTON, op. cit. supra § 372.
